跪求一段金融危機(jī)對(duì)我過出口企業(yè)影響英文資料 跪求金融危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)出口貿(mào)易的影響方面的英文資料
幸虧我來了，不然這題目還真難辦，哈哈！
給你一篇社科院張明博士寫的文章，要引用時(shí)別忘記注明來源，免得侵權(quán)啊，呵呵！
The Impact of the Global Crisis on China and its Reaction (ARI)
Ming Zhang
ARI 62/2009 - 14/4/2009
Theme: The current global financial crisis is having a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy.
Summary: The current global financial crisis is having a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy, affecting exports, foreign exchange reserves and structural adjustments. The Chinese Government’s reaction has so far been effective in boosting short-term economic growth, but has been insufficient to ensure sustainable long-term growth and new risks could arise. Policy suggestions include how to stimulate household consumption effectively, how to mitigate the pressure of unemployment and how to diversify China’s foreign exchange portfolio.
Analysis
Introduction
The US subprime crisis which broke out in the summer of 2007 evolved into a global financial crisis after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The subsequent liquidity squeeze and credit crunch caused a world-wide economic slowdown. The US, the Euro Zone and Japan all slipped into recession in 2008, a situation that is likely to persist at least into 2009. The emerging countries have faced not only a dramatic decline of economic growth, but also a surge of capital outflows. A financial crisis could break out in the central and eastern European economies, driven by significant current account deficits, heavy debt burdens denominated in foreign currencies and a sudden stop or even reversal of capital inflows.
As the largest developing country and an export-driven economy, it would have been impossible for China to dodge the impact of the global financial and economic crisis. First, China is over-dependent on exports to stimulate its economic growth and the weakening of external demand will be a heavy blow for the Chinese economy. Secondly, at the end of 2008 the People’s Bank of China (PBoC, the Chinese central bank) had foreign exchange reserves worth US$1.95 trillion, of which a large part were denominated in US dollars, especially US treasury bonds and agency bonds. The potential devaluation and downgrade of its US treasury or agency bonds resulting from the deepening of the subprime crisis will erode the international purchasing power of China’s foreign exchange reserves. Third, to prevent a slowdown of economic growth, the Chinese government might postpone or even cancel some structural adjustment policies which are necessary to ensure the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy, such as bursting the price bubble in the real estate sector and increasing the flexibility of the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism, among others.
The Chinese government has taken timely and bold countermeasures to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis. Since the third quarter of 2008, the Chinese authorities have adopted a combination of an active fiscal policy and a loose monetary policy. The appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar has been halted since the second half of 2008. Although these measures are quite useful to stimulate short-term economic growth, they cannot ensure long-term sustainable growth and might generate new risks. Therefore, the Chinese government should speed up the structural readjustments which will help to transform China’s growth model and stimulate domestic consumption.
The Impact on China’s Exports
China’s economic growth is over-dependent on the growth of net exports. In 2008, its export-to-GDP ratio reached 32%, and its exports-and-imports-to-GDP ratio was 59%. The contribution of net exports (goods and services) to GDP growth was over 20% in 2007. Moreover, as a labour-intensive sector, exports absorbed a mass of non-skilled workers from rural areas.
The G-3, which account for 46% of the external demand for China’s exports, have all slipped into recession due to the impact of the global financial crisis. Emerging markets, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries, which are China’s major export markets, have also slowed down dramatically. As a result of the weakening external demand, China’s exports have declined significantly since the fourth quarter of 2008. Both exports and imports have registered a contraction (yoy) since November 2008 (see Figure 1). However, due to the decline in world energy and commodity prices and to China’s shrinking internal demand, imports have decreased much faster than exports, causing a surge in the trade surplus.
Figure 1. China’s exports and imports (%, Left; US$100 mn, Right)
Sources: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC.
As a result of the global financial crisis a large number of export-led private enterprises in China’s coastal provinces have gone bankrupt, with around 20 million unskilled workers losing their jobs. Furthermore, the slowdown in China’s exports, along with the decline in real estate investments, has led to a decrease in GDP growth from 13% in 2007 to 9% in 2008.
The exact reason why the Chinese government has put export growth at the top of its list of priorities is that the export sector can absorb excess labour. The huge number of workers released from bankrupt or poorly-operated enterprises has caused a surge in the real unemployment rate, which could lead to social unrest. Hence, the Chinese government has continued to apply tax rebates to export goods, increasing its intervention in the foreign exchange market to prevent the further appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar, and lowering its environmental and energy-consuming criteria. However, external demand is an uncontrollable variable so the Chinese government’s capacity to stimulate exports is facing great challenges, especially in an environment of protectionist pressure.
The Impact on China’s Foreign Currency Reserves
At the end of 2008, China’s foreign exchange reserve had reached US$1.95 trillion. Although the PBoC does not disclose the proportion of currency and assets of its foreign exchange reserves, it is possible to make a rough estimate based on external data. For instance, according to the IMF’s COFER statistics, up to the third quarter of 2008, assets denominated in US dollars, euros, pounds Sterling and yen in the portfolios of developing countries’ reserves totalled respectively 61%, 28%, 6% and 3%. There is no evidence to show that China’s reserves are significantly different from those of other developing countries. The asset composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves can also be estimated through the statistics disclosed by the US treasury on the overseas holdings of US securities. According to the preliminary report on foreign portfolio holdings of US securities at the end of June 2008, China held US$535 billion in US treasury bonds, US$544 billion in US agency bonds, US$27 billion in US corporate bonds and US$100 billion in US equities. Even considering that the PBoC sold agency bonds and bought short-term treasury bonds in the second half of 2008, it can still be concluded that China’s foreign exchange reserves are heavily allocated in US dollar-denominated assets, especially US treasury and agency bonds.
Following the subprime crisis, the US government has applied very loose fiscal and monetary policies. Paulson’s US$700 billion TARP programme, Obama’s US$789 billion stimulus package and Geithner’s US$2 trillion financial stability plan will together create a record-high fiscal deficit, which should reach an estimated US$1.75 trillion in 2009, over 12% of the US GDP. The Fed has cut the benchmark rate from 5.25% to 0-0.25% and has been pumping money and credit into the economy through various types of innovative mechanisms. From the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 to the end of the year the Fed’s balance sheet has grown from US$950 billion to US$2.27 trillion.
To finance the rescue package, the US government has only two choices. The first is to issue more treasury bonds, at least US$2 trillion in 2009. If the demand for US treasury bonds is unable to keep pace with the supply, their market value will decrease. As the largest holder of US treasury bonds, the PBoC will therefore suffer a significant loss. The second choice is that, if other investors are unwilling to continue to buy US treasury bonds, the Fed will become the buyer of last resort, meaning that the US government will take up the printing of bills. Unavoidably, the inflation rate will surge and the US dollar will depreciate against other major currencies. Therefore, the international purchasing power of China’s portfolio of US dollar-denominated assets will shrink markedly.
The Impact on China’s Structural Adjustments
An indirect but critical effect of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy is that, to mitigate the impact on the domestic economy and to stimulate short-term economic growth, the Chinese government might postpone or even cancel some of its structural adjustment policies. However, these structural adjustments are absolutely necessary for the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy.
One example is that, to stimulate short-term economic growth, the Chinese government might resort to reviving real estate investment, which means that it might give up trying to burst the property price bubble. Obviously, from the third quarter of 2008, both central and provincial governments have loosened the controls on property sector. The percentage of down payments and the interest on loans to buy a second home have been reduced. The criteria by which commercial banks grant loans to developers have been lowered. Property developers can again obtain easy financing, reducing the possibility for them to drive down property prices. Considering that there are still obvious bubbles in the property markets of many coastal cities, to loosen controls means that the Chinese government will postpone the necessary adjustment in property prices. However, bubbles always burst at some point. The longer the adjustment is postponed, the greater the final impact of the collapse will be. The Chinese government should take note from the Japanese experience in the late 1980s.
The misalignment of the RMB’s exchange rate has been one of the major factors to have caused the Chinese economy’s external and internal imbalances. To solve this problem, the Chinese government started to reform the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism in July 2005. Its de facto pegging to the US dollar was replaced by managed floating with reference to a basket of currencies, and the pace of the RMB’s appreciation against the dollar accelerated from July 2005 to the first half of 2008. However, after the aggravation and spreading of the global financial crisis, China’s exports declined significantly. To sustain the relative competitiveness of China’s export goods, the PBoC increased its intervention in the foreign exchange market to prevent the further appreciation of the RMB from the third quarter of 2008. In an environment of declining external demand and increasing trade protectionism, it is doubtful that managing the RMB’s exchange rate will help stimulate China’s exports. To make things worse, the bank’s heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market will sustain or even aggravate the country’s external and internal imbalances.
The Chinese Government’s Reaction to the Global Crisis
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Chinese government changed its policy emphasis from curbing inflation to ensuring stable economic growth. The macroeconomic policy combination includes an active fiscal policy, a loose monetary policy and a stable exchange rate policy. In terms of fiscal policy, a RMB4 trillion (US$588 billion) investment plan was released in November 2008, one of the largest fiscal rescue packages world-wide. As for monetary policy, the RMB’s deposit and loan interest rates have been cut from 4.14% and 7.47% to 2.25% and 5.31% respectively. The required reserve ratio has declined from 17.5% to 13.5%. The credit quota applied by the central bank on commercial banks was cancelled in the fourth quarter of 2008. Bank loans increased by RMB1.62 trillion in January 2009, one third of the increment recorded in 2008. As for its exchange rate policy, the PBoC has increased its intervention in the foreign exchange market since the third quarter of 2008, halting the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar.
We do not doubt the Chinese government’s capacity to stimulate short-term economic growth. Over 80% of the RMB4 trillion investment package was allocated to infrastructure and property investments, and the effect should gradually unfold in the second half of 2009 and in 2010. The surge in bank loans in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 will further facilitate these investments. After a time lag of two to three quarters, the expansive macroeconomic policies will push the economy to rebound. Hence, we are relatively optimistic that China’s GDP growth might reach 8% in 2009.
However, the countermeasures the Chinese government has adopted so far might not ensure sustainable economic growth and could entail some new risks. First, China should transform its growth model from export-driven to domestic demand-driven in order to sustain long-term economic growth, which means that the government should try to increase household consumption. However, the fiscal resources to increase household income and provide social welfare are very limited. Secondly, too many resources have been allocated to infrastructure and property investments, and there is a potential risk underlying them. As for infrastructure, there is already an over-investment and excess capacity in certain fields, such as motorways and hydroelectric power stations; in property investment there are still obvious price bubbles in many coastal cities. A surge in investments might aggravate resource misallocation and property price bubbles. Third, the huge amount of banking loans granted from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 might trigger a new surge in non-performing loans (NPLs) on the balance sheets of China’s commercial banks, and NPLs will eventually become a fiscal burden. Fourth, the PBoC has done little to diversify its foreign exchange portfolio from US treasury bonds and agency bonds, although these assets are becoming increasingly dangerous in the mid-term and long-term.
Conclusions
The Right Path: Speeding up Structural Adjustments
The global financial crisis is both a tough challenge and a precious opportunity for China. Although the crisis is affecting China’s exports, employment and foreign exchange reserves, it is also generating external pressure for China to carry out structural adjustments and providing a window of opportunity to expand overseas investment. The Chinese government should fully utilise this opportunity not only to sustain short-term economic growth but also to achieve long-term strategic objectives.
To stimulate short-term economic growth and to speed up structural reforms, China should make increasing household consumption its top priority. The most effective way to boost consumption is to increase household income. Since the mid-1990s, the proportion of household income in national income has been declining, while the proportion of government and corporate income in national income has been rising. This is the root cause of China’s low consumption. Therefore, the idea is to increase the proportion of household income in national income. On the one hand, the Chinese government should cut personal income tax. On the other hand, it should urge state-owned enterprises to disburse dividends to its major share-holder, central or provincial government, in order to then increase unilateral transfers from government to households. Moreover, the Chinese government should employ more fiscal resources to provide social welfare, such as education, heath care and social safety nets, which could significantly reduce the uncertainties in household expectations about future income and expenditure.
To mitigate the pressure of unemployment, the Chinese government should not over-rely on maintaining export growth, because declining external demand and soaring protectionist pressures will weaken any measure by which exports are stimulated. Alternatively, China should promote employment by opening up and developing the service sector. The latter is labour intensive, just like the export sector. Therefore, the service sector has a great potential to absorb unskilled workers released from the export sector. To boost investments in the service sector, the Chinese government should first break up the monopolies of state-owned enterprises in such fields as finance, education, medical care, telecommunication and transport and open these activities to private capital. Secondly, the Chinese government should increase the flexibility of the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism, because an undervalued real exchange rate will tend to exacerbate the resource misallocation between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, ie, too many resources will flow into the tradable sector.
The Chinese government should speed up the diversification of its foreign exchange reserves exploiting the window of opportunity thrown open by the global financial crisis. First, the PBoC should stop buying US treasury bonds unconditionally. The Chinese government needs the US government to provide some sort of guarantee on the market value of US treasury bonds. For instance, the PBoC should henceforth only buy TIPs. Another example is that the Chinese government could require the US to issue convertible treasury bonds, giving creditors an option to transfer the bonds into shares of US commercial banks held by the US government, with the strike price not being much above the price the US government paid to previously purchase the shares. Secondly, a large proportion of China’s foreign exchange reserves should be invested in the energy and commodity markets and the global stock markets, because their valuations are far more reasonable now than hitherto. Especially, investing in the energy and commodity markets now will help the Chinese economy to hedge the risk of price hikes in the future. Third, China should adopt some innovative financing mechanisms to combine providing assistance with the RMB’s internationalisation. For example, China could agree with foreign countries to issue RMB-denominated treasury bonds (‘Panda Bonds’) on the Chinese domestic market, with foreign countries then using the RMB to purchase US dollars from the PBoC. The proposed ‘Panda Bonds’ can not only provide foreign countries with necessary funding but also strengthen the status of the RMB as an international currency. Moreover, they could provide new incentives for China to develop a RMB forward exchange-rate market.
Ming Zhang
Deputy Director of the International Finance Division, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing
By the financial crisis, export enterprises are faced with these difficulties, it is difficult to export sales, reduced profits or even losses, and under-employment rate of decline in production or close down, workers losing their jobs. At the same time, exporters are faced with the risk of loan recovery. Importing countries due to economic recession, businesses and individuals ability to pay, credit reduced payment difficulties arise, exports can not arrive in time in recovering the money, if not impossible to recover the money. Under such circumstances, in response to the plight of the financial crisis in export, the Government, the enterprise should do the following:
First, take a number of measures to increase domestic demand. At present, the expansion of domestic demand is a priority, only to increase domestic demand, the excess domestic production capacity will be absorbed, and thus the elimination of the manufacturing of the root causes of the huge trade surplus. The key lies in expanding domestic demand to promote the financial, education, transportation and environment, modern services sector market-oriented reforms, namely, by increasing the effective supply to expand domestic demand.
Second, continue to intensify efforts to export promotion policies. Introduced to promote the improvement of the export tax rebate rate of some products of policies to promote transformation and upgrading of processing trade, processing trade, the focus of support for the central and western regions to undertake the development, promotion of the gradient transfer of processing trade. Coordination of the financial sector to improve the financial environment for exports and increase credit support to enterprises to improve security conditions for the financing of enterprises, improve the export credit risk protection mechanism.
樓上的那位老兄用翻譯機(jī)器把中文亂譯成鬼都看不明白的“英文”，不要害人啊。
你用如下類似的英文到各大搜索引擎中搜索看看，說不定就有：
impact of financial crisis on China's export enterprises
First, take a number of measures to increase domestic demand. At present, the expansion of domestic demand is a priority, only to increase domestic demand, the excess domestic production capacity will be absorbed, and thus the elimination of the manufacturing of the root causes of the huge trade surplus. The key lies in expanding domestic demand to promote the financial, education, transportation and environment, modern services sector market-oriented reforms, namely, by increasing the effective supply to expand domestic demand.
你用如下類似的英文到各大搜索引擎中搜索看看，說不定就有：
impact of financial crisis on China's export enterprises
悟惠19718128239： 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)外貿(mào)企業(yè)的影響有哪些?
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)外貿(mào)依存度高達(dá)60%.受外部需求減少等多種因素的影響,我國(guó)外貿(mào)出口增幅自去年8月份起呈逐步放緩趨勢(shì).今年1至8月,我國(guó)出口同比增長(zhǎng)22.4%,增幅比去年同期回落5.3個(gè)百分點(diǎn). 美國(guó)這場(chǎng)危機(jī)有從金融業(yè)向?qū)嶓w經(jīng)濟(jì)傳導(dǎo)的可能,我們要做好外需進(jìn)一步收縮的準(zhǔn)備.出口是拉動(dòng)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的“三駕馬車”之一,外部需求放緩導(dǎo)致出口增長(zhǎng)減速,是影響經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)增長(zhǎng)的重要因素.而金融、證券市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定與否,也直接關(guān)系到當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的穩(wěn)定性.
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悟惠19718128239： 有關(guān)金融危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)出口企業(yè)的影響的論文提綱
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昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 首先,尤其是中國(guó)沿海地區(qū)的一些中小企業(yè)主要做出口品,但國(guó)外發(fā)生金融危機(jī),使國(guó)外人的收入減少,從而對(duì)進(jìn)口品的需求減少,所以我國(guó)的出口減...
悟惠19718128239： 金融危機(jī)給那方面帶來的危害大呀?
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昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 對(duì)我國(guó)來說,這次的金融危機(jī)主要是對(duì)出口的企業(yè)有比較大的影響,如果你那機(jī)械廠是出口的那影響肯定就大了,如果是國(guó)內(nèi)不出口的私人廠那影響不大.可以說基本沒有影響.其實(shí)這次金融危機(jī)對(duì)我們國(guó)內(nèi)的很多行業(yè)都沒有影響的,有些只是為了自己更大的私利而亂喊出來作為升價(jià)的一種手段.
悟惠19718128239： 金融危機(jī)會(huì)給社會(huì)帶來什么災(zāi)難? -
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 金融危機(jī)對(duì)中國(guó)的影響: 1.金融業(yè)與對(duì)外貿(mào)易: 影響一 美國(guó)消費(fèi)減少影響中國(guó)出口 出口方面,可以預(yù)料的是我國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的外部環(huán)境將由于此次席卷華爾街的金融風(fēng)暴而更顯嚴(yán)峻.海關(guān)總署的進(jìn)出口數(shù)據(jù)顯示,今年前8個(gè)月,我國(guó)外貿(mào)出口額...
給你一篇社科院張明博士寫的文章，要引用時(shí)別忘記注明來源，免得侵權(quán)啊，呵呵！
The Impact of the Global Crisis on China and its Reaction (ARI)
Ming Zhang
ARI 62/2009 - 14/4/2009
Theme: The current global financial crisis is having a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy.
Summary: The current global financial crisis is having a significant negative impact on the Chinese economy, affecting exports, foreign exchange reserves and structural adjustments. The Chinese Government’s reaction has so far been effective in boosting short-term economic growth, but has been insufficient to ensure sustainable long-term growth and new risks could arise. Policy suggestions include how to stimulate household consumption effectively, how to mitigate the pressure of unemployment and how to diversify China’s foreign exchange portfolio.
Analysis
Introduction
The US subprime crisis which broke out in the summer of 2007 evolved into a global financial crisis after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The subsequent liquidity squeeze and credit crunch caused a world-wide economic slowdown. The US, the Euro Zone and Japan all slipped into recession in 2008, a situation that is likely to persist at least into 2009. The emerging countries have faced not only a dramatic decline of economic growth, but also a surge of capital outflows. A financial crisis could break out in the central and eastern European economies, driven by significant current account deficits, heavy debt burdens denominated in foreign currencies and a sudden stop or even reversal of capital inflows.
As the largest developing country and an export-driven economy, it would have been impossible for China to dodge the impact of the global financial and economic crisis. First, China is over-dependent on exports to stimulate its economic growth and the weakening of external demand will be a heavy blow for the Chinese economy. Secondly, at the end of 2008 the People’s Bank of China (PBoC, the Chinese central bank) had foreign exchange reserves worth US$1.95 trillion, of which a large part were denominated in US dollars, especially US treasury bonds and agency bonds. The potential devaluation and downgrade of its US treasury or agency bonds resulting from the deepening of the subprime crisis will erode the international purchasing power of China’s foreign exchange reserves. Third, to prevent a slowdown of economic growth, the Chinese government might postpone or even cancel some structural adjustment policies which are necessary to ensure the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy, such as bursting the price bubble in the real estate sector and increasing the flexibility of the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism, among others.
The Chinese government has taken timely and bold countermeasures to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis. Since the third quarter of 2008, the Chinese authorities have adopted a combination of an active fiscal policy and a loose monetary policy. The appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar has been halted since the second half of 2008. Although these measures are quite useful to stimulate short-term economic growth, they cannot ensure long-term sustainable growth and might generate new risks. Therefore, the Chinese government should speed up the structural readjustments which will help to transform China’s growth model and stimulate domestic consumption.
The Impact on China’s Exports
China’s economic growth is over-dependent on the growth of net exports. In 2008, its export-to-GDP ratio reached 32%, and its exports-and-imports-to-GDP ratio was 59%. The contribution of net exports (goods and services) to GDP growth was over 20% in 2007. Moreover, as a labour-intensive sector, exports absorbed a mass of non-skilled workers from rural areas.
The G-3, which account for 46% of the external demand for China’s exports, have all slipped into recession due to the impact of the global financial crisis. Emerging markets, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries, which are China’s major export markets, have also slowed down dramatically. As a result of the weakening external demand, China’s exports have declined significantly since the fourth quarter of 2008. Both exports and imports have registered a contraction (yoy) since November 2008 (see Figure 1). However, due to the decline in world energy and commodity prices and to China’s shrinking internal demand, imports have decreased much faster than exports, causing a surge in the trade surplus.
Figure 1. China’s exports and imports (%, Left; US$100 mn, Right)
Sources: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC.
As a result of the global financial crisis a large number of export-led private enterprises in China’s coastal provinces have gone bankrupt, with around 20 million unskilled workers losing their jobs. Furthermore, the slowdown in China’s exports, along with the decline in real estate investments, has led to a decrease in GDP growth from 13% in 2007 to 9% in 2008.
The exact reason why the Chinese government has put export growth at the top of its list of priorities is that the export sector can absorb excess labour. The huge number of workers released from bankrupt or poorly-operated enterprises has caused a surge in the real unemployment rate, which could lead to social unrest. Hence, the Chinese government has continued to apply tax rebates to export goods, increasing its intervention in the foreign exchange market to prevent the further appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar, and lowering its environmental and energy-consuming criteria. However, external demand is an uncontrollable variable so the Chinese government’s capacity to stimulate exports is facing great challenges, especially in an environment of protectionist pressure.
The Impact on China’s Foreign Currency Reserves
At the end of 2008, China’s foreign exchange reserve had reached US$1.95 trillion. Although the PBoC does not disclose the proportion of currency and assets of its foreign exchange reserves, it is possible to make a rough estimate based on external data. For instance, according to the IMF’s COFER statistics, up to the third quarter of 2008, assets denominated in US dollars, euros, pounds Sterling and yen in the portfolios of developing countries’ reserves totalled respectively 61%, 28%, 6% and 3%. There is no evidence to show that China’s reserves are significantly different from those of other developing countries. The asset composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves can also be estimated through the statistics disclosed by the US treasury on the overseas holdings of US securities. According to the preliminary report on foreign portfolio holdings of US securities at the end of June 2008, China held US$535 billion in US treasury bonds, US$544 billion in US agency bonds, US$27 billion in US corporate bonds and US$100 billion in US equities. Even considering that the PBoC sold agency bonds and bought short-term treasury bonds in the second half of 2008, it can still be concluded that China’s foreign exchange reserves are heavily allocated in US dollar-denominated assets, especially US treasury and agency bonds.
Following the subprime crisis, the US government has applied very loose fiscal and monetary policies. Paulson’s US$700 billion TARP programme, Obama’s US$789 billion stimulus package and Geithner’s US$2 trillion financial stability plan will together create a record-high fiscal deficit, which should reach an estimated US$1.75 trillion in 2009, over 12% of the US GDP. The Fed has cut the benchmark rate from 5.25% to 0-0.25% and has been pumping money and credit into the economy through various types of innovative mechanisms. From the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 to the end of the year the Fed’s balance sheet has grown from US$950 billion to US$2.27 trillion.
To finance the rescue package, the US government has only two choices. The first is to issue more treasury bonds, at least US$2 trillion in 2009. If the demand for US treasury bonds is unable to keep pace with the supply, their market value will decrease. As the largest holder of US treasury bonds, the PBoC will therefore suffer a significant loss. The second choice is that, if other investors are unwilling to continue to buy US treasury bonds, the Fed will become the buyer of last resort, meaning that the US government will take up the printing of bills. Unavoidably, the inflation rate will surge and the US dollar will depreciate against other major currencies. Therefore, the international purchasing power of China’s portfolio of US dollar-denominated assets will shrink markedly.
The Impact on China’s Structural Adjustments
An indirect but critical effect of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy is that, to mitigate the impact on the domestic economy and to stimulate short-term economic growth, the Chinese government might postpone or even cancel some of its structural adjustment policies. However, these structural adjustments are absolutely necessary for the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy.
One example is that, to stimulate short-term economic growth, the Chinese government might resort to reviving real estate investment, which means that it might give up trying to burst the property price bubble. Obviously, from the third quarter of 2008, both central and provincial governments have loosened the controls on property sector. The percentage of down payments and the interest on loans to buy a second home have been reduced. The criteria by which commercial banks grant loans to developers have been lowered. Property developers can again obtain easy financing, reducing the possibility for them to drive down property prices. Considering that there are still obvious bubbles in the property markets of many coastal cities, to loosen controls means that the Chinese government will postpone the necessary adjustment in property prices. However, bubbles always burst at some point. The longer the adjustment is postponed, the greater the final impact of the collapse will be. The Chinese government should take note from the Japanese experience in the late 1980s.
The misalignment of the RMB’s exchange rate has been one of the major factors to have caused the Chinese economy’s external and internal imbalances. To solve this problem, the Chinese government started to reform the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism in July 2005. Its de facto pegging to the US dollar was replaced by managed floating with reference to a basket of currencies, and the pace of the RMB’s appreciation against the dollar accelerated from July 2005 to the first half of 2008. However, after the aggravation and spreading of the global financial crisis, China’s exports declined significantly. To sustain the relative competitiveness of China’s export goods, the PBoC increased its intervention in the foreign exchange market to prevent the further appreciation of the RMB from the third quarter of 2008. In an environment of declining external demand and increasing trade protectionism, it is doubtful that managing the RMB’s exchange rate will help stimulate China’s exports. To make things worse, the bank’s heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market will sustain or even aggravate the country’s external and internal imbalances.
The Chinese Government’s Reaction to the Global Crisis
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Chinese government changed its policy emphasis from curbing inflation to ensuring stable economic growth. The macroeconomic policy combination includes an active fiscal policy, a loose monetary policy and a stable exchange rate policy. In terms of fiscal policy, a RMB4 trillion (US$588 billion) investment plan was released in November 2008, one of the largest fiscal rescue packages world-wide. As for monetary policy, the RMB’s deposit and loan interest rates have been cut from 4.14% and 7.47% to 2.25% and 5.31% respectively. The required reserve ratio has declined from 17.5% to 13.5%. The credit quota applied by the central bank on commercial banks was cancelled in the fourth quarter of 2008. Bank loans increased by RMB1.62 trillion in January 2009, one third of the increment recorded in 2008. As for its exchange rate policy, the PBoC has increased its intervention in the foreign exchange market since the third quarter of 2008, halting the appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar.
We do not doubt the Chinese government’s capacity to stimulate short-term economic growth. Over 80% of the RMB4 trillion investment package was allocated to infrastructure and property investments, and the effect should gradually unfold in the second half of 2009 and in 2010. The surge in bank loans in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 will further facilitate these investments. After a time lag of two to three quarters, the expansive macroeconomic policies will push the economy to rebound. Hence, we are relatively optimistic that China’s GDP growth might reach 8% in 2009.
However, the countermeasures the Chinese government has adopted so far might not ensure sustainable economic growth and could entail some new risks. First, China should transform its growth model from export-driven to domestic demand-driven in order to sustain long-term economic growth, which means that the government should try to increase household consumption. However, the fiscal resources to increase household income and provide social welfare are very limited. Secondly, too many resources have been allocated to infrastructure and property investments, and there is a potential risk underlying them. As for infrastructure, there is already an over-investment and excess capacity in certain fields, such as motorways and hydroelectric power stations; in property investment there are still obvious price bubbles in many coastal cities. A surge in investments might aggravate resource misallocation and property price bubbles. Third, the huge amount of banking loans granted from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 might trigger a new surge in non-performing loans (NPLs) on the balance sheets of China’s commercial banks, and NPLs will eventually become a fiscal burden. Fourth, the PBoC has done little to diversify its foreign exchange portfolio from US treasury bonds and agency bonds, although these assets are becoming increasingly dangerous in the mid-term and long-term.
Conclusions
The Right Path: Speeding up Structural Adjustments
The global financial crisis is both a tough challenge and a precious opportunity for China. Although the crisis is affecting China’s exports, employment and foreign exchange reserves, it is also generating external pressure for China to carry out structural adjustments and providing a window of opportunity to expand overseas investment. The Chinese government should fully utilise this opportunity not only to sustain short-term economic growth but also to achieve long-term strategic objectives.
To stimulate short-term economic growth and to speed up structural reforms, China should make increasing household consumption its top priority. The most effective way to boost consumption is to increase household income. Since the mid-1990s, the proportion of household income in national income has been declining, while the proportion of government and corporate income in national income has been rising. This is the root cause of China’s low consumption. Therefore, the idea is to increase the proportion of household income in national income. On the one hand, the Chinese government should cut personal income tax. On the other hand, it should urge state-owned enterprises to disburse dividends to its major share-holder, central or provincial government, in order to then increase unilateral transfers from government to households. Moreover, the Chinese government should employ more fiscal resources to provide social welfare, such as education, heath care and social safety nets, which could significantly reduce the uncertainties in household expectations about future income and expenditure.
To mitigate the pressure of unemployment, the Chinese government should not over-rely on maintaining export growth, because declining external demand and soaring protectionist pressures will weaken any measure by which exports are stimulated. Alternatively, China should promote employment by opening up and developing the service sector. The latter is labour intensive, just like the export sector. Therefore, the service sector has a great potential to absorb unskilled workers released from the export sector. To boost investments in the service sector, the Chinese government should first break up the monopolies of state-owned enterprises in such fields as finance, education, medical care, telecommunication and transport and open these activities to private capital. Secondly, the Chinese government should increase the flexibility of the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism, because an undervalued real exchange rate will tend to exacerbate the resource misallocation between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, ie, too many resources will flow into the tradable sector.
The Chinese government should speed up the diversification of its foreign exchange reserves exploiting the window of opportunity thrown open by the global financial crisis. First, the PBoC should stop buying US treasury bonds unconditionally. The Chinese government needs the US government to provide some sort of guarantee on the market value of US treasury bonds. For instance, the PBoC should henceforth only buy TIPs. Another example is that the Chinese government could require the US to issue convertible treasury bonds, giving creditors an option to transfer the bonds into shares of US commercial banks held by the US government, with the strike price not being much above the price the US government paid to previously purchase the shares. Secondly, a large proportion of China’s foreign exchange reserves should be invested in the energy and commodity markets and the global stock markets, because their valuations are far more reasonable now than hitherto. Especially, investing in the energy and commodity markets now will help the Chinese economy to hedge the risk of price hikes in the future. Third, China should adopt some innovative financing mechanisms to combine providing assistance with the RMB’s internationalisation. For example, China could agree with foreign countries to issue RMB-denominated treasury bonds (‘Panda Bonds’) on the Chinese domestic market, with foreign countries then using the RMB to purchase US dollars from the PBoC. The proposed ‘Panda Bonds’ can not only provide foreign countries with necessary funding but also strengthen the status of the RMB as an international currency. Moreover, they could provide new incentives for China to develop a RMB forward exchange-rate market.
Ming Zhang
Deputy Director of the International Finance Division, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing
By the financial crisis, export enterprises are faced with these difficulties, it is difficult to export sales, reduced profits or even losses, and under-employment rate of decline in production or close down, workers losing their jobs. At the same time, exporters are faced with the risk of loan recovery. Importing countries due to economic recession, businesses and individuals ability to pay, credit reduced payment difficulties arise, exports can not arrive in time in recovering the money, if not impossible to recover the money. Under such circumstances, in response to the plight of the financial crisis in export, the Government, the enterprise should do the following:
First, take a number of measures to increase domestic demand. At present, the expansion of domestic demand is a priority, only to increase domestic demand, the excess domestic production capacity will be absorbed, and thus the elimination of the manufacturing of the root causes of the huge trade surplus. The key lies in expanding domestic demand to promote the financial, education, transportation and environment, modern services sector market-oriented reforms, namely, by increasing the effective supply to expand domestic demand.
Second, continue to intensify efforts to export promotion policies. Introduced to promote the improvement of the export tax rebate rate of some products of policies to promote transformation and upgrading of processing trade, processing trade, the focus of support for the central and western regions to undertake the development, promotion of the gradient transfer of processing trade. Coordination of the financial sector to improve the financial environment for exports and increase credit support to enterprises to improve security conditions for the financing of enterprises, improve the export credit risk protection mechanism.
樓上的那位老兄用翻譯機(jī)器把中文亂譯成鬼都看不明白的“英文”，不要害人啊。
你用如下類似的英文到各大搜索引擎中搜索看看，說不定就有：
impact of financial crisis on China's export enterprises
First, take a number of measures to increase domestic demand. At present, the expansion of domestic demand is a priority, only to increase domestic demand, the excess domestic production capacity will be absorbed, and thus the elimination of the manufacturing of the root causes of the huge trade surplus. The key lies in expanding domestic demand to promote the financial, education, transportation and environment, modern services sector market-oriented reforms, namely, by increasing the effective supply to expand domestic demand.
你用如下類似的英文到各大搜索引擎中搜索看看，說不定就有：
impact of financial crisis on China's export enterprises
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受國(guó)外技術(shù)性貿(mào)易措施影響較大的省份排在前五位的是廣東省、山東省、江蘇省、上海市、河南省。2009年，受金融危機(jī)的影響，我國(guó)遭受貿(mào)易摩擦將更加嚴(yán)重，增加出口的困難。最后，我國(guó)的出口還將受到生產(chǎn)成本升高、出口企業(yè)融資困難與融資成本上升、出口政策調(diào)整不確定性、人民幣升值壓力的影響，上述影響對(duì)于一...
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昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)外貿(mào)依存度高達(dá)60%.受外部需求減少等多種因素的影響,我國(guó)外貿(mào)出口增幅自去年8月份起呈逐步放緩趨勢(shì).今年1至8月,我國(guó)出口同比增長(zhǎng)22.4%,增幅比去年同期回落5.3個(gè)百分點(diǎn). 美國(guó)這場(chǎng)危機(jī)有從金融業(yè)向?qū)嶓w經(jīng)濟(jì)傳導(dǎo)的可能,我們要做好外需進(jìn)一步收縮的準(zhǔn)備.出口是拉動(dòng)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的“三駕馬車”之一,外部需求放緩導(dǎo)致出口增長(zhǎng)減速,是影響經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)增長(zhǎng)的重要因素.而金融、證券市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定與否,也直接關(guān)系到當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的穩(wěn)定性.
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)使我國(guó)的出口受到很大的阻礙,東莞四分之一的出口企業(yè)已經(jīng)垮臺(tái).今年可能更嚴(yán)重. 直接影響: 主要是對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)的沖擊;對(duì)我國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備縮水的影響,進(jìn)而影響國(guó)內(nèi)部分金融機(jī)構(gòu)的業(yè)績(jī).如果我國(guó)持有的一些美國(guó)公司的債券并...
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 摘要:2008年下半年美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)引發(fā)的金融風(fēng)暴導(dǎo)致新的全球性經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)爆發(fā),造成全球蕭條持續(xù).本次危機(jī)是石油+金融復(fù)合型的危機(jī),殺傷力非常大.危機(jī)的源頭是...
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 首先是出口行業(yè),江浙沿海一帶的制造業(yè)受影響最大.隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的到來,美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的消費(fèi)大幅萎縮,會(huì)對(duì)我國(guó)一些出口企業(yè)的訂單造成較大的影響. 至于國(guó)內(nèi)的金融等行業(yè)受的影響一般不大,因?yàn)槲覈?guó)銀行還是傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)營(yíng) 模式,金融創(chuàng)新不是很高,就算有一些次貸的影響憑著我國(guó)的金融實(shí)力還是能夠消化掉的. 但這次金融經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)的金融業(yè)創(chuàng)新也是個(gè)絕好的機(jī)會(huì),從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看,應(yīng)該是利好的.
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 造成我國(guó)的出口企業(yè)面臨嚴(yán)峻形勢(shì),首當(dāng)其沖受到影響的是金融、證券投資、國(guó)際貿(mào)易、房地產(chǎn)、汽車等行業(yè).此時(shí)正值大學(xué)畢業(yè)生求職的重要時(shí)期,金融危機(jī)會(huì)給大學(xué)生就業(yè)造成多大的影響,還難以預(yù)測(cè),但目前可以初步判斷,隨著金融危機(jī)...
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 目 錄 一、金融危機(jī)產(chǎn)生背景及其主要影響1 (一) 金融危機(jī)爆發(fā) 1 1. 金融危機(jī)的起源——次貸危機(jī)1 2. 次貸危機(jī)演變成金融危機(jī)2 二、金融危機(jī)對(duì)我國(guó)中小型企業(yè)的影響2 (一) 金融危機(jī)對(duì)中小企業(yè)造成的影響 3 1.海外訂單大幅下降,企業(yè)開...
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 首先,尤其是中國(guó)沿海地區(qū)的一些中小企業(yè)主要做出口品,但國(guó)外發(fā)生金融危機(jī),使國(guó)外人的收入減少,從而對(duì)進(jìn)口品的需求減少,所以我國(guó)的出口減...
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 從我國(guó)來講,對(duì)出口業(yè)影響最大,金容危機(jī)造成我國(guó)第四季度出口下降17.8.進(jìn)口下降2.2%.一些中小外貿(mào)企業(yè)紛紛倒閉或破產(chǎn).外資企業(yè)也紛紛撤資.這些都直接影響了我國(guó)就業(yè)市場(chǎng)的困難.據(jù)我所知.廣東就倒閉了7千多家企業(yè).光湖北就回鄉(xiāng)30多萬農(nóng)民工. 明年的就業(yè)形勢(shì)會(huì)更加嚴(yán)峻. 經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑是必然趨勢(shì).我國(guó)已明確提出明年經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率保八.這將是以個(gè)非常困難的艱巨任務(wù)
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 對(duì)我國(guó)來說,這次的金融危機(jī)主要是對(duì)出口的企業(yè)有比較大的影響,如果你那機(jī)械廠是出口的那影響肯定就大了,如果是國(guó)內(nèi)不出口的私人廠那影響不大.可以說基本沒有影響.其實(shí)這次金融危機(jī)對(duì)我們國(guó)內(nèi)的很多行業(yè)都沒有影響的,有些只是為了自己更大的私利而亂喊出來作為升價(jià)的一種手段.
昌邑區(qū)粗鏜： ______ 金融危機(jī)對(duì)中國(guó)的影響: 1.金融業(yè)與對(duì)外貿(mào)易: 影響一 美國(guó)消費(fèi)減少影響中國(guó)出口 出口方面,可以預(yù)料的是我國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的外部環(huán)境將由于此次席卷華爾街的金融風(fēng)暴而更顯嚴(yán)峻.海關(guān)總署的進(jìn)出口數(shù)據(jù)顯示,今年前8個(gè)月,我國(guó)外貿(mào)出口額...
